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ABSTRACT
This research describes our survey of data remaining on computer hard disks sold on the
second hand market in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This is a repetition of the first
survey conducted in 2012 (Jones, Martin, & Alzaabi, 2012). Similar studies have been carried
over the last ten years in the United Kingdom, Australia, USA, Germany and France: (Jones,
Mee, Meyler, & Gooch, 2005), (Jones, Valli, Sutherland, & Thomas, 2006), (Jones, Valli,
Dardick, & Sutherland, 2008), (Jones, Valli, Dardick, & Sutherland, 2009). This research was
undertaken to gain insight into the volumes of data found on second-hand disks purchased
in the UAE, as well as any changes that have occurred since the previous survey. We
will also compare these results to those produced in other regions of the world to gain an
understanding of the relative level of the problem of residual data in the UAE.
The core methodology of the research adopted for this study was the same as has been used
for the other global studies. The methodology included the acquisition of a number of second
hand computer disks from a range of sources and their subsequent analysis. The goal of the
analysis was to determine whether any data could be recovered from the disk and if so,
whether the data that it contained could be used to determine the previous owner or user.
If information was found on the disks and the previous user or owner could be identified,
the research examined whether the information was of a sensitive nature or in a sufficient
volume to represent a risk.
Keywords: Computer forensics, disk analysis, data recovery, data disposal, data destruc-
tion, data leakage, privacy.
1. INTRODUCTION
As technology advances, computers occupy
an ever-more important role in our lives. We
rely on them for everything, including com-
munication, education, transport, finance,
as well as entertainment. As their impor-
tance increases, so does the amount of data
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about us that we allow them to store. Mo-
bile and personal devices, with their wide
array of sensors to gather data, as well as
close ties to social networks, further exacer-
bate the problem. While new features and
improved convenience are often at the fore-
front of the consumer’s mind, and security
often takes a back seat (although awareness
of security issues is slowly improving). The
lack of caution is especially a problem when
it comes to disposing of devices. The typical
lifespan of computing devices is shrinking,
and proper sanitization of the confidential
data they contain is not always performed
before disposal. The potential impact of
such lapses could vary from minor embar-
rassment of individuals to organizations suf-
fering major data breaches. The information
recovered in (Jones et al., 2012) ranged from
holiday photos to confidential interviews col-
lected as part of a University study.
The research question of this survey is:
what are the amounts and types of infor-
mation that remain on computer disks that
have been offered for sale on the second hand
market in the UAE. This is the second such
survey to be conducted in this region (Jones
et al., 2012). We are repeating the survey
to determine what, if any, changes have oc-
curred in the practices of data sanitization
and disposal in the interim.
The overall finding of our survey was that
there is still a dangerously high amount of
sensitive data that remains on second-hand
disks sold in the UAE. The research re-
vealed that the number of disks that con-
tain personally identifiable information has
greatly increased, far above the global figure.
The number of disks containing information
related to organizations has also increased
compared to the previous survey, but is still
below the global figure.
The aim of the research was to determine
whether any data remained on second hand
computer disks and if it did, the potential
sensitivity of the information to the previous
owner. The research was conducted under
the same conditions that had been used dur-
ing previous second hand disk and hand-held
mobile devices studies, carried out by the
University of Glamorgan, Edith Cowan Uni-
versity, Longwood University, and British
Telecommunication: (Jones et al., 2005),
(Jones et al., 2006), (Jones, Valli, Dardick,
& Sutherland, 2008), (Jones, Valli, Dardick,
& Sutherland, 2009). The tools used were
common and easily available, and equated
to the undelete and unformat commands in
older versions of Windows (Fisher, 2016) and
a hexadecimal editor. We have made a new
addition to this survey: all files recovered
were also scanned for malware. The results
of the research are that a number of obser-
vations can be made with regard to the level
and type of information remaining on sec-
ond hand computer disks and a number of
conclusions and recommendations have been
made on ways to improve the situation with
regard to data remaining on second hand
computer disks.
In Section 2 we will give an overview of
similar studies. We describe the methodol-
ogy of our survey in Section 3. Section 4
consists of the results of the survey, first pre-
sented on their own, then compared to the
related works. Finally, we give our conclu-
sions and recommendations in Sections 5 and
6 respectively.
2. RELATED WORKS
The first survey of data remaining on second-
hard hard disks was performed in (Jones et
al., 2005). This set out the general method-
ology that later surveys followed (including
this one). Disks were purchased in small
batches from different sources around the
UK (92 in total). The disks were imaged and
searched for identifying information. This
initial survey revealed that sensitive data re-
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maining on disks appeared to be widespread.
13% were faulty, and 16% of the remainder
were wiped. Of the remaining disks, 70%
had commercial data and 59% had individ-
ual data present.
In subsequent years, the survey was re-
peated, both to determine what, if any,
changes occurred in the practice of data san-
itization before re-sale, and to also include
data from other locations. In (Jones et al.,
2006) and (Jones, Valli, & G. S. Dardick,
2008), the survey included disks from the
UK, Australia, North America, and Ger-
many. France was added to the list of coun-
tries in (Jones, Valli, Dardick, & Sutherland,
2008) and (Jones, Valli, Dardick, & Suther-
land, 2009). The observed trend shows a
slow but steady decline in the number of
disks with identifiable data present, but still
remaining at a level to raise concern.
The first survey of second hand disks in
the UAE was conducted in (Jones et al.,
2012). The fraction of devices with indi-
vidual or organisational data was less than
the global rates. Specific results will be pre-
sented in comparison to this present survey
in Section 4.2.
Other surveys have been conducted on
other storage media. Instead of hard drives,
USB drives were examined in (Jones, Valli,
& Dabibi, 2009). Mobile phones were
purchased and studied in (Valli & Jones,
2008). Both surveys revealed similar lapses
in proper sanitization of devices before re-
sale, but the specific types of personal data
varied.
The subject of the ethics of research
involving residual data was discussed in
(Glisson, Storer, Blyth, Grispos, & Camp-
bell, 2016). As well as reviewing the risks
and privacy concerns of past studies, sev-
eral recommendations were made: Identify-
ing clear research objectives, suitable train-
ing for investigators, anonymization of infor-
mation disclosed, complete lifecycle security
practices, liaising with relevant ethics com-
mittees, and particular care when data is
crossing national boundaries.
3. RESEARCH
METHODOLOGY
To ensure that the results of the research
provide a realistic and scientifically sound
view of the situation, 40 second hand com-
puter disks were obtained. All of the com-
puter disks used in the research were pur-
chased in computer or mobile phone shops
in four of the Emirates (Abu Dhabi, Dubai,
Sharjah, and Fujairah). The computer disks
were purchased discretely, either separately
or in small lots by a number of purchasers.
This procedure was adopted in order to min-
imise the possibility of the sellers becom-
ing aware of the purpose for which the com-
puter disks were being obtained and to en-
sure that the actions of one seller did not
have a disproportionate effect on the results
of the study.
The computer disks were supplied “blind”
to the researchers. This means that the re-
searchers had no indication of the source of
the computer disks that they were analysing.
The only identifying mark on the computer
disks that were provided to the researchers
was a unique sequential serial number so that
there was no indication of where or how they
had been obtained (other than specifying the
Emirate). The research methodology used
was the same as that used in the previous
surveys: (Jones et al., 2005), (Jones et al.,
2006), (Jones, Valli, Dardick, & Sutherland,
2008), (Jones, Valli, Dardick, & Sutherland,
2009). The steps taken to examine each disk
were as follows:
1. The disk was forensically imaged
2. The image was imported into FTK
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3. File carving was performed on the im-
age, seeking to recover Office docu-
ments, image files, PDFs, and html files
4. The filesystem was manually examined
for identifiable information, in particu-
lar the commonly used areas
5. Samples of the various filetypes were
manually examined for identifiable in-
formation
6. On discovery of any potential identi-
fiable information, searches were per-
formed to find the locations of other
matches
7. Hashes of all recovered files were up-
loaded to Virustotal
The forensic imaging was performed with
readily available software (Raptor 3.0 Live
CD1 or AccessData Forensic Tool Kit (FTK)
Imager 3.1.0.15142). The analysis was then
undertaken on the forensic images of the
computer disks. There were two main rea-
sons for the adoption of this time consuming
step. The first was to preserve the original
media in its original state and store it in a
secure area in case criminal activity was dis-
covered and there was a requirement to pass
the disks on to law enforcement. By adopt-
ing this procedure, the chain of custody was
preserved for any investigation by law en-
forcement. This allowed the research to be
carried out in a non-intrusive manner that
did not affect or change the original data.
The second was that if any anomalies were
detected with the image, it would be possible
to validate the data against a second image
created from the original.
1https://www.forensicsandediscovery.com/
Pages/Raptor.aspx Accessed 10th August 2016
2http://accessdata.com/product-download/
digital-forensics Accessed 10th August 2016
The tools used in this study to analyse the
images of computer disks were fundamen-
tally the same as those used in previous disk
studies (although the versions of the tools
have changed). The primary tool used was
FTK 4.0.0.35120. The tools performed sim-
ilar functions to the Windows unformat and
undelete commands. File carving of com-
mon file types was also performed as it is
a reliable method for recovering files from
unallocated space (e.g. either deleted files
or files on a disk that has been formatted).
Where it was necessary to manually exam-
ine information that existed in the unallo-
cated portion of the computer disk, hexadec-
imal editors were used. Tools that perform
this type of functionality are free and readily
available: examples include forensic analysis
tools such as Autopsy3 and the Linux Kali
distribution4. Freeware Hexadecimal editors
include XVI325 and HxD6. These tools can
be used effectively by anyone with a mod-
erate level of skill investing some time and
effort. I.e. it is reasonable to assume these
actions could be performed by a malicious
actor.
For this year’s survey, we also introduced
the use of malware scans. All executables
recovered from the disks were checked with
the VirusTotal database7. This is intended
to give an indication of the prevalence of
malware on devices in the region, as well
as also highlighting the risks posed by the
use of second hand disks. All recovered ex-
ecutable files from the disks were hashed
3http://www.sleuthkit.org/autopsy/ Ac-
cessed 12th August 2016
4https://www.kali.org/ Accessed 12th August
2016
5http://www.chmaas.handshake.de/delphi/
freeware/xvi32/xvi32.htm Accessed 12th August
2016
6https://mh-nexus.de/en/hxd/ Accessed 12th
August 2016
7https://www.virustotal.com/ Accessed 15th
August 2016
Page 26 c© 2016 ADFSL
The 2016 Analysis of Information Remaining on Computer ... JDFSL V1N4
and the hashes uploaded to the VirusTotal
site using a script. The hashes are then
checked against a number of anti-malware
scans (generally 56 or 57 in our experi-
ments). Since only the hashes were up-
loaded, this necessarily means that the scans
were purely signature based, as opposed to
heuristic. In order to reduce the numbers of
false positives, we only consider a file to be
malware if three or more of the scans flag the
file as malicious.
In order to protect the privacy of the pre-
vious owners of the disks, appropriate mea-
sures were taken. The disks were stored in
a physically secure location and all analy-
sis was done on an isolated network. Only
those with suitable training took part in the
analysis and no identifying details have been
included in the publication of the research.
The objectives of the research were the
same as those defined for the previous disk
and hand held mobile device studies: firstly
to determine whether the computer disks
that were obtained in the UAE had been ef-
fectively cleansed of data or whether they
still contained information that was either
visible or easily recoverable with the tools
identified above. The second objective of the
research was to identify whether there was
information that could be used to identify
the organisation or individual(s) that had
used the computer disks.
4. RESULTS
4.1 2016 Results
The initial results indicate that there was a
significant amount of information found on
computer disks in the UAE compared to the
previous study, considerably more for per-
sonal information. There was also an in-
crease in the number of disks obtained that
contained highly sensitive/high risk informa-
tion.
This section details the results for the
study for the 40 computer disks obtained in
the UAE:
• 7 disks (17.5%) were damaged and as a
result, unreadable.
• 7 (17.5%) had been effectively cleaned
and contained no recoverable data8
• Of the remaining 26 (65%) disks
– 15 (37.5%) had been deleted or for-
matted, but still contained recov-
erable data.
– 11 (27.5%) contained data that
could be easily recovered,
– 9 (22.5%) contained sufficient in-
formation for the organisation that
they had come from to be identi-
fied.
– 20 (50%) contained sufficient infor-
mation for individuals to be iden-
tified.
– 17 (42.5%) contained malware.
The results are presented as graphs in Fig-
ure 1. The significance of the first category
of the remaining 26 disks is that the pre-
vious owner has made a naive attempt to
sanitize the disk, typically through format-
ting and re-installation of the OS. This is not
enough to prevent file carving of many of the
user’s files. The second category, where data
could be easily recovered, suggests that with
more effort expended more files could be re-
covered. This is likely the case. Since file
carving does not work with file fragments for
example, one could use known techniques to
try to find and match fragments. This was
not done for a number of reasons. First, the
time involved in such analysis would greatly
8Either the disk was entirely \x00 bytes or was
entirely random bytes.
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Figure 1. Summary of results. Note that for all the disks where it was possible to identify
the organization, it was also possible to identify the individual user. Hence to 0% portion of
disks where only the organization was identified.
reduce the size of the sample that could be
managed, and the larger the sample size the
more reflective the results. Second, it seems
unrealistic for a malicious actor to go to such
lengths unless they knew there was some-
thing of value to be found. Thirdly, our rec-
ommendations at the end of the paper do
not merely have the aim of making the user’s
data “not easy” to recover, but rather impos-
sible to recover.
4.2 Comparison to Previous
Results
In Figure 2 we compare these results with
those of the previous survey for the UAE, as
well as the previous global survey. There is
a noticeable increase in the amount of disks
obtained that stored sensitive data relating
to individuals. CVs, passport scans, and ID
card scans were obtained from many of the
disks. The fact that such scans are often re-
quested when registering for services means
they are more likely to be stored and kept
by the users, but also increases the poten-
tial damage they could do in terms of fraud.
The number of disks storing sensitive data
relating to organizations has only slightly
increased, but is still much lower than the
value from the previous global survey.
Figure 3 shows an assessment of the level
of risk that the data recovered would pose to
the individual or the organisation. Whereas
the previous survey had relatively few disks
with medium and high risk data present,
this time it appears to have significantly in-
creased. This suggests a worrying trend of
the increased use of technology for conve-
nience, without a corresponding use of pro-
tection and disposal mechanisms that are
necessary to ensure the security and privacy
of the data. There also seems to be a blur-
ring of the distinction between devices used
for work and for personal use. We often came
across disks that had both types of use. The
question of whether they were personal de-
vices where the owner often did their work,
or work devices with a significant amount of
personal use was difficult to decide.
As mentioned in Section 3, we included a
malware scan of the disks for the first time
in this survey. Of the 26 disks that had re-
coverable data, 65.4% (17/26) were flagged
as having malware by our VirusTotal scan
(meaning each of those 17 disks had at least
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Figure 2. Comparison of results from the 2009 global survey, the previous 2012 UAE survey
and the current 2016 survey (figures for data present are percentages of the number of disks
that had not been wiped/faulty)
Figure 3. Assessment of level of Risk of the data recovered
one file that was flagged as malicious by at
least three anti-malware scanners). This is a
significant portion of the sample, and indi-
cates an absence of suitable protection mech-
anisms in the region. It also suggests a risk
to using second hand disks or devices.
Details for the top five are given in Table 1.
The staggering number of malware files on
these disks is surprising. If we take an even
more conservative approach and only con-
sider a file malicious if 30 or more anti-
virus scanners flag it as malware (over half),
then we see the numbers are reduced; dra-
matically in some cases (L1 and L5), but
only slightly in others (L4). This would
seem to confirm that although there may
be some false positives, there are certainly
many cases of malware on the disks. The dif-
ferences do suggest a wide variance in perfor-
mance of the anti-virus scanners. On their
website, they do disclaim that “VirusTotal
is not responsible for false positives gener-
ated by any of the resources it uses” and
that some of the scans are configured to be
more aggressive than the public commercial
versions (Unspecified, 2016). This would in-
crease the chances of false positives.
The previous UAE survey noted the pres-
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Disk Label Executable
files
Flagged by
3+
scanners
Flagged by
30+ scanners
Disk L1 35,208 320 14
Disk L2 9,248 179 60
Disk L3 52,758 158 16
Disk L4 49,256 113 103
Disk L5 15,834 42 1
Table 1. Top 5 disks based on numbers of files flagged as malicious by at least 3 anti-virus
scans in VirusTotal. Numbers of files flagged by at least 30 anti-virus scans also shown
ence of Passport scans and other identity
documents in many of the disks. This trend
has continued, and even increased. Sensi-
tive documents are required for many ser-
vices in the UAE, and there are few precau-
tions taken to control how these documents
are spread. Other specific instances of valu-
able data, originating from commercial and
private individuals, are detailed below9:
• One disk had Funds Transfer Form
(including account numbers) for an
amount of over 680,000 AED.
• One disk was likely from a bank, and
had records of a number of audits of se-
curity controls at a specific branch. It
also had customer call sheets, with cus-
tomers’ account and mobile numbers.
There was even a document titled “Se-
curity Plan & Security Personnel Job
Descriptions.”
• One disk contained a file named “Job
Sites Userids.txt,” which seemed to
have login usernames (and possibly
passwords) for various sites and ser-
vices. The passwords (if that was what
they were) were not particularly strong.
9All financial transactions and balances are
stated in UAE dirham (AED). At the time of writ-
ing, the exchange rate is 1 AED equals 0.24 Euro or
0.27 USD.
• One disk was from a jewelry store and
has several invoices for 6 figure sums (in
AED).
• One disk was connected to local ship-
ping. Recovered files included an agree-
ment document between a shipping
company and travel center, with signa-
tures and seals, a crew list of 50 for a
vessel with personal details of each, in-
voices from the shipping company, and
“Sharjah Port Authority Master’s Re-
port.” Also of note was a fax to the
Security Office at Ajman Port regard-
ing which people were allowed to go on-
board vessels to carry out repairs.
• One disk had a comprehensive collection
of financial details of a single individ-
ual, with bank account opening forms,
credit card statements (with complete
numbers), details of investments, and
scanned checks for dividends. A sum-
mary slide listed account numbers, bal-
ances, and PINs. Some statements were
encrypted, but using a password based
on the individual’s date of birth. This
date was readily available from other
documents on the disk and the state-
ments were decrypted10.
10We also simulated what would have been neces-
sary if the password policy was known but the user’s
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• One disk had several highly sensi-
tive documents from a company in
the Oil & Gas industry. Files in-
cluded geological data, satellite im-
agery, “Annual Reservoir Performance
Report January 2006,” map of “Most
Likely Oil-In-Place Potential (Yet to
Find),” “Planned Development Wells,”
“SCADA Systems for *Region* Wells,”
“Review and Audit of key techni-
cal processes.” Documents described
projects costing tens of millions of dol-
lars. A “Longer Term View” forecast
was present with projections up to 2034.
Technology, for the most part, has kept
pace with the need to protect information to
an appropriate level while it is in use and
to destroy it effectively when it is no longer
required. The observed failures from com-
mercial organisations seem to be a result of
a lack of corporate policies and procedures
for the protection and subsequent disposal
of obsolete computer disks or a failure to ef-
fectively implement these policies where they
do exist. For private users, the cause is more
likely to be a lack of awareness of the risk
arising from failing to erase such informa-
tion. Equally, they may not be aware of the
availability of the tools and techniques to en-
sure that data is properly erased when it is
no longer required.
The subject of the effective erasure of data
was first highlighted in a 1996 conference pa-
per (Gutmann, 1996) that reported research
on the secure deletion of data. A second pa-
per (Gutmann, 2001) examined Data Rema-
nence in Semiconductor Devices and a fur-
ther paper (Garfinkel & Shelat, 2003) looked
at the measures that could be taken to “san-
itize” computer disks. In the period since
birth date was not. We wrote a simple script to
check all dates as passwords starting at the 1st of
January 1900. After 16 minutes the correct pass-
word was found.
the issue was first raised, there has been an
ongoing series of news reports on high profile
cases where personal or organisational infor-
mation has been found in the public domain.
There has also been increasing publicity and
awareness of the issue of identity theft and
the guidance on how to protect both per-
sonal and organisational information.
There are now a good range of tools that
can be used to effectively erase data from
computer disks; however, there appears to
be an ongoing issue with making the users
aware of the problem. With the ever in-
creasing levels of theft of both corporate
and personal information that are being re-
ported ((Arthur, 2014), (Nakashima, 2015),
(Perlroth, 2015), (Harding, 2016)) and the
availability of suitable tools to erase data, it
is difficult to explain the amount of informa-
tion that has been found in this survey. It
is clear that further investigation needs to
be carried out to understand the underlying
cause.
For those computer disks that were for
personal use, the results indicate that there
is an issue with awareness and education of
the users as to what information is sensitive
and how they can ensure that it is destroyed.
For the most part the disks are used to store
music, videos, photographs and other, of-
ten small items of information that the user
will not necessarily consider to be significant.
The items of information that were consis-
tently found on the disks that are considered
to be of high risk were copies of passports,
visas, and bank account details.
For the disks that contained commercial
information, there was a range of informa-
tion on the companies’ operations and cus-
tomers. This would be embarrassing and
potentially damaging to the business if the
knowledge that they had released it into the
public domain became known.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
The issue of the use and subsequent disposal
of computer hard disks is a significant prob-
lem, and is bound to grow as such threats as
identity theft and data disclosures becomes
more prevalent. The results of the survey in
the UAE show that the volume of relevant
information recovered has grown since the
previous survey, and also that there is even
more extremely sensitive information that is
not being properly disposed. The number of
disks wiped has even slightly reduced. To
compound the matter, because of local cus-
toms and requirements, where personal in-
formation was recovered it was potentially
highly damaging.
Comparing these results to surveys done
in other regions shows two significant de-
partures. The disks in the UAE had sig-
nificantly greater numbers of disks with in-
dividual data, but significantly fewer disks
with organizational data. The reasons be-
hind the possible differences are hard to pre-
cisely determine. It may be that “recycling”
of devices is more common a practice among
individuals in the UAE than with organiza-
tions. If users were aware of, and were fol-
lowing, proper data sanitization procedures,
we would have expected to see a greater
number of wiped disks. The numbers for
this survey were actually less than both the
previous UAE survey and those from other
regions.
A number of the disks examined were
found to contain sensitive corporate or per-
sonal information and the consequence of
failing to remove or erase this data is that
it continues to be available to anyone that
might seek to exploit it. There is ongoing
clear requirement that staff within organi-
sations be given the appropriate awareness,
education and training programmes. They
need to be able to ensure that computer
disks and other media is properly managed
and that the data that they contain is pro-
tected properly while in use and then erased
before the disks are disposed. For the disks
from personal computers, there is a need for
the owner to be educated with regard to
the potential risks caused by the informa-
tion and the steps that they can take to ef-
fectively erase the data when they dispose of
the computer.
6.
RECOMMENDATIONS
There are a number of measures that can be
taken by both individuals and organisations
to reduce the volume of sensitive information
that is inadvertently given away when they
dispose of computer disks. These include:
1. Education - A public awareness cam-
paign by Government, the media, com-
merce and/or academia.
2. Risk Assessment The organisation car-
ries out risk assessments to determine
sensitivity of the information that may
be stored on the computer disks that are
being disposed.
3. Roles and Responsibilities The assign-
ing of the roles and responsibilities to
those individuals responsible for issu-
ing, managing and disposing of com-
puter disks.
4. Best Practices - The introduction of
procedures within organisations to en-
sure that computer disks are disposed
of in an appropriate manner.
5. Physical Destruction - Where appropri-
ate, the physical destruction of the com-
puter disks.
6. Encryption - The encryption of the com-
puter disks to ensure that information
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cannot be easily recovered in the event
of their loss, theft or disposal.
7. Data Erasure Provide access to the
tools and facilities to enable individu-
als to effectively remove the information
from their computer disks.
8. Regulation - Require all manufacturers
to include built-in means for the total
erasure of all data within devices.
These simple measures could play a signif-
icant part in reducing the risks posed by the
inadequate disposal of devices.
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